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Abstract
We re-examine the literature on mobile termination in the presence of network ex-
ternalities. Externalities arise when firms discriminate between on- and off-net calls
or when subscription demand is elastic. This literature predicts that profit decreases
and consumer surplus increases in termination charge in a neighborhood of termina-
tion cost. This creates a puzzle since in reality we see regulators worldwide pushing
termination rates down while being opposed by network operators. We show that this
puzzle is resolved when consumers’ expectations are assumed passive but required to
be fulfilled in equilibrium (as defined by Katz and Shapiro, AER 1985), instead of
being rationally responsive to non-equilibrium prices, as assumed until now.
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1 Introduction
The market for mobile telecommunication services is in many countries rather competitive,
as consumers have often the choice between at least three or four network operators so
that operators have to compete vigorously to attract (and retain) customers. An important
technological aspect of telecommunications is that subscribers of different network operators
can call each other, which means that different networks are compatible. The possibility
(and even obligation) to interconnect two networks has been key to promote entry and
competition. Surely, the value of owning a mobile would be much reduced if one could only
call people that subscribe to the same network. Unfortunately, the existence of competition
and the need to interconnect has created a new bottleneck. Since most people will only
subscribe to one of the networks, each network holds a monopoly position over the so called
market for termination of calls directed to its subscribers.1 If each network is free to set the
price it will charge other networks for terminating calls, this termination charge (sometimes
referred to as access price) would be set at a (too) high level. This in turn would induce
networks to price calls at inefficiently high levels, and thus make the retail market rather
uncompetitive, at least in terms of efficiency and prices, despite the presence of multiple
networks.2
Surprisingly, more competition in the retail market may actually exacerbate the problem.
It is easily established that, under the usual assumption of a balanced calling pattern, the
fraction of off-net calls equals 1−HHI/10000, where HHI denotes the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index. Hence, the less concentrated the market is, the larger the fraction of calls that will
be off-net, which are the ones that have to pass through the bottleneck. High termination
charges in relatively competitive retail markets could prove to be particularly harmful when
operators charge different prices for on- and off-net calls, since then high termination charges
may affect off-net prices more than on-net prices.
Regulators around the world, and especially in the European Union, are concerned about
too high termination charges and intervene in the markets of termination. Initially regu-
1European national regulatory authorities are required by the European Commission to periodically
assess the markets for termination and typically find that all mobile network operators have significant
market power in these markets.
2In countries where consumers are charged for receiving calls, such as the US, it is not so clear whether
the terminating operator wants to set a very high termination charge to the originating operator. In these
countries termination charges are often low (eg. Bill and Keep). However, it is not obvious whether low
termination charges induce firms to charge consumers for receiving calls, or whether the fact that consumers
are charged for receiving calls induces firms to set low termination charges. The current paper deals with
the case where only the calling party pays, which happens to be the case in most countries, especially in the
European Union.
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lators allowed higher termination charges for late entrants in order for them to overcome
start-up problems. More recently regulators tend to treat operators more equally and low-
ered termination charges for all of them considerably. At present, the European Commission
recommends national regulators to push termination rates further down to the cost of ter-
minating a call by the end of 2012. (EC 2009a).3 Mobile operators have repeatedly opposed
the cuts in termination rates imposed by the national regulatory authorities (NRAs) during
the last decade. This is of course a clear indication that mobile operators fear to see their
profits reduced when termination charges are decreased.4 This seems inconsistent with the
argument of some operators that excessive termination charges are irrelevant because these
will be returned to consumers in the form of lower retail prices for some mobile services, such
as hand-set subsidies.5 Some operators even warned regulators that reducing termination
charges would distort competition and hurt consumers because increased subscription fees
would reduce mobile penetration.6 Some NRAs did not believe that a reduction in termina-
tion charge would lead to an increase in retail price. Others, on the other hand, accepted the
argument that above cost termination charges could be used to subsidize marginal consumers
to join a network, increase mobile penetration and thereby internalize the network external-
ity. The UK regulator Ofcom calculated the so called externality surcharge to be positive,
but very mild and took it into account when determining the termination charge (Ofcom,
2007). The European Commission, however, recommends against applying a surcharge and
aims for termination charges equal to cost (EC 2009b, par 5.2.4.).
The initial academic literature on two-way termination charges confirms the concerns of
regulators that high termination charges lead to excessive profits and, more importantly,
to an inefficient structure of retail prices.7 Armstrong (1998) and Laffont, Rey and Tirole
(1998a) show that, in a setting where firms set one linear price, firms prefer to have above cost
termination charges, whereas (total or consumer) welfare maximizing termination charges
are below cost. Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1998b) find that if firms set linear prices but
can discriminate between on- and off-net calls, then above cost termination charges induce
3In the initial stages of wireless telecommunication the most important regulatory issue was the fixed-
to-mobile (FTM) termination rate, i.e. the price to be paid by the incumbent land-line operator for calls
terminating on a mobile network. High FTM charges acted as a subsidy for the mobile operators in the
initial phase of development. At present the mobile market is rather competitive and well-developed in most
European countries. There is less need to subsidize mobile operators and the main issue that regulators are
concerned about is how mobile termination charges affect competition. In this paper we do not consider the
fixed line operators and focus exclusively on the mobile market.
4T-Mobile made this concern explicit in response to the 2006 public consultation procedure in the UK.
See Ofcom, 2006, par 7.12.
5See Ofcom, 2006, par. 7.7.
6Ofcom, 2007, par. 7.8.
7For an excellent literature review on two-way access pricing we refer the reader to Armstrong (2002).
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firms to increase the price for off-net calls and reduce it for on-net calls. The effect on
profits is ambiguous: If firms are sufficiently differentiated, joint profits are maximized by
a termination charge above cost, while if firms are close substitutes, joint profits may be
maximized by a termination charge below cost.8 Again, welfare maximizing termination
charges are below cost.
In practice, many contracts for telecommunication services use non-linear prices since
they include monthly subscription or minimum usage fees. Firms will then set the variable
usage price efficiently so as to maximize consumer surplus, and extract rents and compete
for market share by charging a fixed fee. Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) consider two-part
tariffs when firms cannot charge different prices for on- and off-net calls. The usage price
will reflect the average marginal cost so that firms make profits from on-net calls but suffer
a loss from outgoing off-net calls. This induces firms to compete more fiercely for market
share by lowering their fixed fee. Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) show that there is an exact
profit neutrality result: Firms do not care about the level of termination charges since the
extra profit earned on calls through higher call prices is exactly off-set by the lowered fixed
fee. There is a 100 per cent waterbed effect.9 The profit neutrality result suggests that firms
should not oppose the proposals of regulators to set termination charges at the efficient level
(in this context, equal to the cost of termination). This seems quite at odds with the fact that
operators usually do oppose cuts in termination rates.10 The profit neutrality result seems to
be a knife-edge result and a minor change in the model could overturn it, in either direction.11
Carter and Wright (2003) show that in an asymmetric duopoly the large firm always strictly
prefers termination charge at cost while the small firm prefers termination charge at cost
only if the asymmetry is large. Dessein (2003) shows that when subscription demand is
elastic, a positive externality surcharge is typically welfare increasing, but that firms would
obtain higher profits from below cost termination charges. The intuition for this result is
that there exists a positive network externality since each consumer benefits from having
an additional subscriber. Because of competition, each firm only partially internalizes this
externality. However, by having low termination charges and usage prices, the externality
8Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1998b, Proposition 2) only point out that the profit maximizing termination
charge initially increases in the substitutability parameter but may decrease for high values of this parameter.
They did not show that in fact the optimal termination charge may be below cost.
9The term waterbed effect was first coined by the late Prof. Paul Geroski during the investigations of the
impact of fixed-to-mobile termination charges on retail competition. See also Genakos and Valletti (2009).
10The only case we are aware of a firm that favors low termination charges is the mobile phone company
“3” (Hutchinson) in the UK. In May 2009 it started a campaign “Terminate the Rate” to lower termination
rates.
11It is worth noting though that neither increasing the number of firms (Tanger˚as, 2009) nor allowing for
heterogeneity of customers (Dessein, 2003 and Hahn, 2004) suffices to overturn this result.
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becomes larger and more of it will be internalized. These results are of course again at odds
with the resistance of operators against reductions in termination charges although they do
largely support the views of NRAs.
Another striking result applies when firms use non-linear prices and are allowed to charge
different prices for on-net and off-net calls (as many operators in fact do). In this case, vari-
able prices will be set equal to perceived marginal cost, so that equilibrium profits accrue
from the collection of fixed fees and from the provision of termination services. Laffont, Rey
and Tirole (1998b) show that the total profit of firms is strictly decreasing in termination
charge. Building on this result, Gans and King (2001) show that firms strictly prefer be-
low cost termination charges. The intuition behind this result is that when there is a price
differential between on- and off-net calls, there are so-called tariff-mediated network exter-
nalities: consumers care about the size of each network. In particular, when termination
charge is above cost, off-net calls will be more expensive than on-net calls so that consumers
will then prefer to belong to the larger network. As a result, lowering the fixed fee will
become a more effective competitive tool to increase market share and price competition is
intensified.12 Clearly, firms prefer instead to soften competition and this can be attained by
having termination charge below cost, which comes at the expense of reduced social welfare
and consumer surplus.
This result has been shown to be very robust. It holds for any number of networks
(Calzada and Valletti, 2008), when call externalities are taken into account (Berger, 2005)
and when networks are asymmetric (Lo´pez and Rey, 2009). Hurkens and Jeon (2009) show
that the result also holds when there are both direct network externalities (i.e., elastic
subscription demand as in Dessein, 2003) and tariff-mediated network externalities (i.e. on-
and off-net price differentiation as in Gans and King, 2001).
The theoretical results with non-linear pricing show that the collusion concern that firms
can obtain excessive profits are not necessarily associated with high termination charges,
as the models with linear pricing argue. From a policy perspective, however, excessive
profits are only of a secondary concern. The primary concern should be the efficiency of
the retail pricing structure. The above models predict that welfare maximizing termination
charges are below cost (when prices are linear) and at cost (when prices are non-linear)
with a positive or negative mark-up, depending on whether network externalities or call
12A similar intuition applies for the case of linear prices considered before. In that case, lowering the on-net
price becomes a more effective competitive tool. As seen before, the effect of increasing termination charge on
firms’ profit is ambiguous in the case of linear discriminatory prices since it depends on the substitutability
between firms.
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externalities, respectively, are thought to be relevant. Reducing termination charges to cost
seems therefore certainly welfare increasing and may be at least a good second-best policy.
However, this conclusion is drawn from models that at the same time predict that operators
would favor reductions in termination charges, which is certainly wrong. Hence, regulatory
policy to date has been based on an incomplete understanding of strategic interaction in
mobile markets.
Very recently, a few attempts have been made to reconcile theory with real world practice.
Armstrong and Wright (2009)13, Jullien, Rey and Sand-Zantman (2009)14, and Hoernig,
Inderst and Valletti (2009)15 have in common that they introduce additional realistic features
of the telecommunication industry into the Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998b) framework and
then show that for some parameter range joint profits are maximized at termination charges
above cost. Moreover, these papers conclude that the need to regulate termination charges
is reduced since the socially optimal termination charge would also be above cost.
We present in this paper a rather different solution to the puzzle, and also come to a very
different conclusion. Instead of adding one or more realistic features of telecommunication
competition to the Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998b) framework, we focus on an element that
has always been present in this framework, but has practically gone unnoticed. Namely, we
address the issue of how consumers form expectations about the size of networks. These
expectations are crucial whenever externalities exist. We show that a seemingly innocuous
twist of the modeling of such expectations predicts, quite generally, that (i) firms prefer
termination charges above cost while (ii) socially optimal termination charges are below or
at cost.
The literature thus far assumes that first firms compete in prices, then consumers form
13Armstrong and Wright (2009) argue that mobile-to-mobile charges cannot be seen independently from
fixed-to-mobile charges. Mobile operators prefer high FTM charges as this provides a subsidy to mobile
networks. If MTM and FTM charges must be chosen uniformly, as is in fact the case in most European
countries, firms will trade off desirable high FTM and desirable low MTM charges and arrive at some
intermediate level, which may well be above cost. However, for this argument to go through, one needs to
assume that (i) there is some room for mobile market expansion, and that (ii) income from fixed lines is
sufficiently important. If (i) does not hold, FTM subsidies would be completely competed away because of
the waterbed effect and firms would then still prefer termination charges below cost. If (ii) does not hold,
the Gans and King (2001) effect of softening competition between mobile operators would dominate and
firms again would prefer termination charges below cost.
14Jullien, Rey and Sand-Zantman (2009) consider a model with heterogeneous consumers. “Small users”
are assumed to have a more elastic demand than “large users” and not all small users necessarily participate.
Assuming that firms do not differentiate between on- and off-net calls, termination charges above cost are
both good for firms and for welfare, as it increases the competition for and the participation of small users.
15Hoernig, Inderst and Valletti (2009) assume the existence of calling clubs. That is, people are more likely
to call friends (people similar to themselves). In this case the calling pattern is not uniform but skewed.
They show that in this case usage prices will not be set equal to perceived marginal cost. In fact, on-net
price will be above, and off-net price will be below perceived marginal cost. They show that if the calling
pattern is very skewed, then firms prefer to have termination charge above cost.
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expectations about network sizes (and these thus may depend on the prices chosen by firms)
and finally consumers make optimal subscription decisions, given the prices and their expec-
tations. A strong rationality condition is imposed on expectations. Namely, for all prices
expectations are required to be self-fulfilling. We will refer to such expectations as rationally
responsive. Consumers having rationally responsive expectations means that any change of
a price, how tiny it may be, by one firm is assumed to lead to an instantaneous rational
change in expectations of all consumers, such that, given these changed expectations, opti-
mal subscription decisions will lead realized and expected network sizes to coincide. So a
unilateral change in price does not lead only to a change in market shares, but it also leads
consumers to accurately predict how market shares will change.
In this paper we propose to relax the assumption of rationally responsive expectations and
to replace it by one of fulfilled equilibrium expectations. This concept was first proposed
by Katz and Shapiro (1985). Katz and Shapiro (1985) assume that first consumers form
expectations about network sizes, then firms compete (in their Cournot model by setting
quantities), and finally consumers make optimal subscription or purchasing decisions, given
the expectations. These decisions then lead to actual market shares and network sizes.
Katz and Shapiro impose that, in equilibrium, realized and expected network sizes are the
same. We will refer to such expectations throughout the paper as passive (self-fulfilled)
expectations. They are passive as they do not respond to out of equilibrium deviations by
firms.
We show that when expectations are assumed passive, as in Katz and Shapiro (1985),
results about termination charges in mobile network industries are in fact in line with real
world observations. Firms typically prefer above cost termination charges and regulators
are justified in their efforts to push termination charges down. In particular, and most im-
portantly, we overturn the Gans and King (2001) result. When firms compete in non-linear
prices and can distinguish between on- and off-net calls (and subscription demand is inelas-
tic), firms prefer termination charge above cost so that off-net calls are priced at monopoly
prices. Fixed fees and on-net prices are not influenced by the termination charge and thus,
in this model, there is no waterbed effect at all.16 Socially optimal termination charges are
equal to cost. When subscription demand is elastic, a termination charge above cost reduces
participation, consumer surplus and total welfare. From a social point of view it is thus opti-
mal to set termination below cost, as it helps to internalize the network effect. Although Bill
16The complete absence of a waterbed effect depends on the assumption of duopoly. We show that in
oligopolies with more than two firms a partial waterbed effect exists. In any case, firms prefer termination
charges above cost.
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and Keep (zero termination charges) is not necessarily optimal, it could perform better than
cost-based termination charges. On the other hand, firms prefer termination charge above
cost, unless the network effect is so strong that firms prefer to increase penetration rather
than to increase fixed fees. This means that in most European countries — with penetration
rates already close to 100 per cent — firms prefer above cost termination charges.
It turns out that characterizing equilibrium prices by means of first-order conditions is
easier when expectations are assumed passive than when expectations are assumed rationally
responsive. This allows us to consider many different extensions in a single paper. Our main
result is shown to be robust to the inclusion of call externalities, as in Berger (2005). If
the call externality is modest, firms prefer again above cost termination charges. If the
call externality is very strong, however, firms prefer termination charge below cost in order
to reduce connectivity breakdown. This is because in this case, even when termination is
charged at cost, off-net call prices would be too high, above the monopoly level. We also
re-examine Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998b) when firms compete in linear prices. We find
that on-net price is independent of termination charge, and that off-net price is increasing
in termination charge. Consequently, profits are maximized by a termination charge above
cost.17 Finally, we also consider the case of brand loyalty causing asymmetric networks and
show that both networks will prefer above marginal cost termination charges. This happens
despite the fact that the smaller firm will compete more aggressively for market share when
consumers come with termination profits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly discuss
the vices and virtues of the different assumptions about consumer expectations. Section 3
introduces the general model with passive expectations. Section 4 deals with the models in
which all consumers subscribe to one of the networks. We start in subsection 4.1 with the
case in which firms use non-linear prices and distinguish between on- and off-net calls, as in
Gans and King (2001). In subsection 4.2 we extend the model to allow for call externalities.
Next, in subsection 4.3 we re-examine Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998b) where firms compete
in linear prices and distinguish between on- and off-net calls. The last part of section 4 is
dedicated to the case of two asymmetric networks as in Carter and Wright (1999, 2003),
but where firms distinguish between on- and off-net prices (as in Lo´pez and Rey, 2009).
Section 5 deals with elastic subscription demand, so that the total number of subscribers is
endogenous. Firms compete in non-linear prices. We examine both the case of termination-
17This result depends again on the duopoly assumption. With more than two firms on-net price is de-
creasing in termination charge but joint profits are still maximized by termination charge above cost.
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based price discrimination (as in Hurkens and Jeon, 2009) and the case where firms must
set the same price for on- and off-net calls (as in Dessein, 2003). Section 6 concludes. Proofs
for sections 4 and 5 are collected in Appendix A and B, respectively.
2 Passive versus Responsive Expectations
Expectations are important in any model with network effects, not just in the case of telecom-
munication. Examples include two-sided markets such as newspapers or credit cards. Read-
ers care about the number of adds and advertisers care about the number of readers. Mer-
chants care about the number of users of a particular credit card and users care about the
number of merchants accepting a particular credit card. Network effects can also occur in
financial markets. The riskiness of a bank may very well depend on its size, that is, the
number of depositors. Of course, depositors will care about the riskiness and thus about the
number of other people who will deposit in a given bank. (See Matutes and Vives, 1996.)
Expectations even play a role in markets without network effects. For example, consider a
monopolistic upstream supplier of an input to several downstream firms that compete with
each other in a final product market. The prices paid for the inputs determine the marginal
costs for the downstream firms. If the prices of inputs are set secretly, each downstream firm
needs to form expectations about the prices paid by its competitors in order to know how
profitable competition will turn out to be and to determine the demand for inputs. In this
context passive beliefs seem very reasonable and widely accepted.18
Many papers have been written on markets with network effects and some have modeled
consumer expectations as passive and some have modeled them as rationally responsive.19
Very few papers justify or even discuss the assumption about expectations. Katz and Shapiro
(1985) do mention the possibility of responsive beliefs in their Appendix, but in their quantity
setting framework results are not altered in an important manner.20 Lee and Mason (2001)
take the issue of expectations serious and point out that the results change dramatically if
rationally responsive beliefs are used in their pricing game. Matutes and Vives (1996) char-
18See Hart and Tirole (1990), O’Brien and Shaffer (1992), Fontenay and Gans (2005) and Rey and Tirole
(2007). McAfee and Schwartz (1994) also consider so called “wary”, non-passive, beliefs.
19Examples of the first include Katz and Shapiro (1985), Matutes and Vives (1996), Economides (1996b),
Lee and Mason (2001) and Malueg and Schwartz (2006). Examples of the latter include Cre´mer, Rey and
Tirole (2000), Caillaud and Jullien (2003) and Galeotti and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2009).
20Hermalin and Katz (2009) also consider Cournot competition. They argue that “the Cournot model can
be viewed as a means of approximating a dynamic process in which consumer expectations with respect to
network sizes change slowly over time because consumers observe network sizes and predict that these sizes
will remain stable.”
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acterize the equilibria under passive beliefs but do point out that with rationally responsive
expectations any pair of deposit rates leading to non-negative profits can be sustained as an
equilibrium. Finally, Griva and Vettas (2004) analyze price competition in a duopoly where
products are both horizontally and vertically differentiated and exhibit positive, product-
specific network effects. They do so both for the case where prices do not influence consumer
expectations (passive) and for the case where firms can influence expectations through prices
(rationally responsive). They point out that competition is more intense under the latter
assumption.
In order to illustrate the difference between passive and responsive expectations, and to
explain why rationally responsive expectations may intensify competition, let us consider
a duopolistic industry with network effects. Each network is located at one end of the
Hotelling interval [0, 1] over which consumers are uniformly distributed. Suppose the value
of subscribing to network i equals vi(αi), where αi denotes the size of network i. We will
assume here that network effects are positive (i.e., v′i > 0) and that networks compete for
consumers in flat fees, denoted by F1 and F2. Given these fees, market shares are stable at
(α0, 1− α0) if the consumer at location α0 is exactly indifferent between the two networks,
that is when
v1(α0)− tα0 − F1 = v2(1− α0)− t(1− α0)− F2,
where t > 0 denotes the Hotelling transportation cost. In other words, given fees F1 and F2
expectations (α0, 1− α0) are fulfilled.
Now let us investigate what happens when suddenly firm 1 lowers its price to F1 − ∆.
How will consumers react?
If consumers take into account only the direct pecuniary effect of the lower price, the
result will be that some consumers will switch to network 1. The consumers who will switch
are those at locations x ∈ (α0, α1), where α1 is defined by
v1(α0)− tα1 − (F1 −∆) = v2(1− α0)− t(1− α1)− F2.
That is,
α1 = α0 +∆/(2t).
After these switches have occurred, network 1 has increased in size. Since network effects
are assumed to be positive, the consumer located at α1 will no longer be indifferent. In fact,
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all consumers located at x ∈ (α1, α2) will now switch to network 1, where
α2 = α1 + [v1(α1)− v1(α0) + v2(1− α0)− v2(1− α1)]/(2t).
Note that the right-hand side does not directly depend on ∆, but only indirectly through the
changed network sizes. Of course, the story continues as network sizes have changed again.
Defining recursively
αk+1 = αk + [v1(αk)− v1(αk−1) + v2(1− αk−1)− v2(1− αk)]/(2t),
one observes that in consecutive steps consumers in (αk, αk+1) will switch to network 1. In
the limit, limk→∞ αk = α∞ where
v1(α∞)− tα∞ − (F1 −∆) = v2(1− α∞)− t(1− α∞)− F2.
The limit market shares (α∞, 1−α∞) are equal to the rationally responsive expectations
given fees F1−∆ and F2. In contrast, the market shares (α1, 1−α1) correspond to the (now
no longer) fulfilled passive expectations (α0, 1− α0).
One thus concludes that lowering the fee is a more competitive tool for gaining market
share when expectations are rationally responsive than when expectations are passive: a
decrease of the fee by ∆ increases market share of network 1 under rationally responsive
expectations by α∞ − α0, while under passive beliefs, market share is only increased by
α1 − α0. Beliefs are passive when consumers only take into account the direct pecuniary
effect of a price decrease. Beliefs are rationally responsive when consumers also take into
account all the indirect, higher order, effects that a decrease of the fee has on network size.
In the remainder of this section we briefly point out some of the virtues and vices of
rationally responsive expectations. We do not pretend to provide a complete discussion nor
do we intend to convince the reader that the assumption of passive beliefs is always more
appropriate than the one of rationally responsive expectations. We hope to convince the
reader that considering passive beliefs is not completely unreasonable and that exploring the
consequences of employing this assumption in the context of telecom competition is very
fruitful.
• Subgame Perfection
The assumption of rationally responsive expectations is theoretically quite pleasing, be-
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cause of its similarity with subgame perfection. Indeed, the assumption is equivalent to
demanding that consumers play a Nash equilibrium of the subscription/purchasing/deposit
game, once prices are set, for any prices. An equilibrium of the price setting game then
corresponds to a subgame perfect equilibrium of the whole game. Instead, assuming passive
self-fulfilling expectations will just correspond to a Nash equilibrium of this game. It should
be noted though that subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes are not always more appealing
than other Nash equilibrium outcomes. A clear example is the ultimatum game, where the
first player proposes a division of a dollar and the second player can only accept or reject.
The subgame perfect equilibrium predicts that the proposer will propose to take (almost) all
and that the responder will accept. There are Nash equilibria in which a more even split is
agreed upon, and such outcome can even be evolutionarily stable.21 Experimental evidence
clearly shows very little support for the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome.
• Multiplicity and Coordination
A typical problem of models with network effects is the multiplicity of equilibria.22 For
example, an equilibrium with positive sales often coexists with one where no trade takes
place. The latter equilibrium is supported by having consumers believe that nobody else
will participate in the market. Also, a shared market equilibrium may coexist with cornered
market equilibria. For example, in the Hotelling model outlined above cornered market
equilibria exist when v1(0) = v2(0) = 0: if all consumers expect one network to corner the
market, this network will in fact corner the market. This type of multiplicity of equilibria
can occur both with passive and with responsive expectations.
A potentially more severe problem — which only occurs with responsive beliefs — is that
for given prices multiple rational expectations exist. This can occur because the rational
expectations demand curve can have increasing parts, so that for the same price three or
more rational demands exist.23 Also, in the Hotelling model for some prices both shared
market and cornered market expectations can be rational. In such a case the assumption
that consumers are able to coordinate on one of the equilibria is very strong. Moreover, in
such a case it is very easy to construct many different equilibria by threatening to continue
with a very bad equilibrium in case some firm deviates from the candidate equilibrium prices.
This occurs for example in the Matutes and Vives (1996) model of depositors and is also
21See Gale, Binmore, and Samuelson (1995).
22See section 3.4 in Farrell and Klemperer (2007) for an extensive discussion of the coordination problem
in network industries.
23See for example Economides (1996a).
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mentioned as a possibility in Galeotti and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2009).
It is also worthwhile to point out that in the case of multiplicity of rational expectations
for given prices, some rational expectations are sometimes discarded as they are considered to
be unstable. For example, the ones on the increasing part of the rational expectation demand
curve are typically unstable in a taˆtonnement process where consumers adapt their decisions
based on previously realized network size. That is, some rationally responsive expectations
are discarded (and of course, some other is selected) on the basis of an adaptive process
where consumers have myopic, non-rational, expectations. The same occurs in Laffont, Rey
and Tirole (1998b) when they discard the shared market equilibrium when also cornered
market equilibria exist. This suggests that there seems to be some merit in assuming that
consumers are myopic, naive or passive even for those that do employ the assumption of
rationally responsive expectations.
• Dynamics and Commitment
It is well known that initial conditions and path dependence are important in markets
with network effects. The most appropriate form to model such markets would inherently
involve dynamics. Ideally, we would like to consider a truly dynamic model in which both
consumers and firms can change their decisions over time. As long as relatively few consumers
can switch in each period and consumers are impatient, the resulting prices and policy
recommendations will probably not depend in very great detail on how expectations are
exactly defined, because then expectations would be strongly correlated with previous period
market shares in any case. Analyzing a truly dynamic model is beyond the scope of the
present paper.24
Calculating rationally responsive expectations involves solving a (possibly complex) fixed-
point problem for any combination of prices. This requires not only a high level of analytical
skill on the part of each consumer, it also requires that each consumer is confident that all
other consumers will (be able to) make such calculations. An alternative, evolutive, method
to arrive at the new market shares is to let consumers sequentially adapt their subscription
responses to the price and the realized market shares. When no consumer wishes to change
her decision any more, one has arrived at the new market shares, which would coincide with
the rationally responsive expectations given the new prices.25
24Even within a dynamic model with network effects, consumer expectations can be modeled as myopic or
as forward looking. Cabral (2009), Driskill (2007) and Laussel and Resende (2007) consider forward looking
consumers. Doganoglu (2003) and Mitchell and Skrzypacz (2006) consider myopic consumers. Radner and
Sundararajan (2006) allow for a mixture of forward looking and boundedly rational consumers.
25See our discussion above of the Hotelling duopoly with network effects.
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A potential problem with this is that it could take a very long time and, at least in the
telecommunication sector, firms may want to change their prices before the consumers have
fully adapted. It may be very hard for firms to commit to a price. For example, in the
Spanish market, the recent entrant (Yoigo) offers a contract with free on-net calls. Clearly,
it would be rational for all consumers in Spain to switch and make free calls for the rest of
their lives. This does not and will not happen. Once the market share of the entrant passes
a certain threshold, it will certainly withdraw the offer (or go bankrupt).
Notice that the difference between rationally responsive and self-fulfilling passive expec-
tations does not occur for equilibrium prices (when all consumers have correct expectations
in either case) but rather when prices are out of equilibrium. And exactly when prices
are out of equilibrium, at least one firm has an incentive to deviate, which makes his price
commitment not credible.
3 The Model
We consider competition between two full-coverage networks, 1 and 2, indexed by i 6= j ∈
{1, 2}. Each has the same cost structure. The marginal cost of a call equals c = cO+cT , where
cO and cT denote the costs borne by the originating and terminating network, respectively.
To terminate an off-net call, the originating network must pay a reciprocal and non-negative
access charge a to the terminating network. The termination mark-up is equal to
m ≡ a− cT .
Therefore, the perceived cost of calls is the true cost c for on-net calls, augmented by the
termination mark-up for the off-net calls: c+ a− cT = c+m.
Networks (i.e., firms) offer differentiated but substitutable services. The two firms com-
pete for a continuum of consumers of unit mass. Each firm i (i = 1, 2) charges a fixed fee
Fi and may (or may not) discriminate between on-net and off-net calls. Firm i’s marginal
on-net price is written pi and off-net price is written pˆi. Consumer’s utility from making
calls of length q is given by a concave, increasing and bounded utility function u(q). Demand
q(p) is defined by u′(q(p)) = p. The indirect utility derived from making calls at price p is
v(p) = u(q(p))− pq(p). Note that v′(p) = −q(p). For given prices p and pˆ, the profit earned
on the on-net calls is
R(p) = (p− c)q(p),
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whereas the profit earned on the off-net calls is
Rˆ(pˆ) = (pˆ− c−m)q(pˆ).
We assume that R(p) has a unique maximum at p = pM , is increasing when p < pM ,
and decreasing when p > pM . That is, pM denotes the monopoly price. We assume that
R(pM) > f , where f is the fixed cost per subscriber. This means that the market is viable.
The Ramsey price pR is defined as the lowest break-even price characterized by
R(pR) = f .
We make the standard assumption of a balanced calling pattern, which means that the
percentage of calls originating on a given network and completed on another given (including
the same) network is equal to the fraction of consumers subscribing to the terminating
network. Let αi denote the market share of network i. The profit of network i is therefore
equal to:
pii ≡ αi
(
αiR(pi) + αjR̂(p̂i) + Fi − f
)
+ αiαjmq(p̂j). (1)
The first term represents the profit made on consumer services (on-net and off-net calls,
fixed fee and cost), whereas the second term represents the profit generated by providing
termination services.
We assume that the terms of interconnection are negotiated (or regulated) first. Then,
for a given access charge a (or equivalently, a given m) the timing of the game is as follows:
1. Consumers form expectations about the number of subscribers of each network i
(βi) with β1 ≥ 0, β2 ≥ 0 and β1 + β2 ≤ 1. We let β0 = 1 − β1 − β2 denote the
number of consumers that is expected to remain unsubscribed. In the case of full
participation β0 = 0 and β1 + β2 = 1.
2. Firms take these expectations as given and choose simultaneously retail tariffs Ti =
(Fi, pi, p̂i) for i = 1, 2.
3. Consumers make rational subscription and consumption decisions, given their expec-
tations and given the networks’ tariffs.
Therefore, market share αi is a function of prices and consumer expectations. Self-
fulfilling expectations imply that at equilibrium βi = αi.
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4 Full Participation
In this section we assume that the networks are differentiated a` la Hotelling. Consumers are
uniformly located on the segment [0, 1], whereas the two networks are located at the two
ends of this segment (x1 = 0 and x2 = 1). For a given volume of calls q and a given income
y, a consumer located at x and joining network i obtains a gross utility given by
y + u(q)− |x− xi| /(2σ),
where σ > 0 measures the degree of substitutability between the two networks. To ensure
full participation we will assume that the surplus derived from being connected to either
network is sufficiently large. We will focus our attention on the properties of shared market
equilibria, where both firms have strictly positive market shares.26
4.1 Non-linear pricing and termination-based price discrimination
In this subsection we assume that firms can set a fixed fee, an on-net price and an off-net
price, as in Gans and King (2001). We first characterize the prices in a shared market
equilibrium. Afterwards we show that such an equilibrium indeed exists and is unique.
Given the balanced calling pattern assumption and consumer expectations β1 and β2,
the surplus from subscribing to network i (gross of transportation costs) equals:
wi = βiv(pi) + βjv(pˆi)− Fi.
Market share of network i is thus given by αi = 1/2 + σ(wi −wj), whenever this is between
0 and 1.
Marginal cost pricing. As usual, at equilibrium with strictly positive market shares,
network operators find it optimal to set cost-based usage prices. Adjusting Fi so as to
maintain net surpluses w1 and w2 and thus market shares constant, leads network i to set
pi and p̂i so as to maximize
αi
(
αiR(pi) + αjRˆ(p̂i) + βiv(pi) + βjv(pˆi)− wi − f
)
+ αiαjmq(p̂j).
26Cornered market equilibria, where one firm dominates the whole market, may exist, but are of little
relevance in mature markets.
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The first-order conditions are
(αi − βi)q(pi) + αi(pi − c)q′(pi) = 0 (2)
and
(αj − βj)q(p̂i) + αj(p̂i − c−m)q′(p̂i) = 0. (3)
At equilibrium, self-fulfilling expectations (βi = αi) yield perceived marginal cost pricing as
long as both firms have positive market share: pi = c and p̂i = c +m. Note, however, that
out of equilibrium firms do not necessarily want to set usage prices equal to marginal cost.
Market shares. If firms set usage prices equal to marginal cost, and if consumers expect
market shares β1 and β2, the actual market share, αi, as a function of expectations and fixed
fees F1 and F2, is given by
αi(βi, Fi, Fj) =
1
2
+ σ (Fj − Fi) + 2σ
(
βi −
1
2
)
(v(c)− v(c+m)) . (4)
Equilibrium fixed fees. We now characterize the equilibrium fixed fees. Since in a
shared market equilibrium network operators find it optimal to set cost-based usage prices,
network i’s profit can be written as:
pii = αi (βi, Fi, Fj)
[
Fi − f + αj
(
βj, Fj, Fi
)
R(c+m)
]
, (5)
where R(c +m) = mq(c +m) is the profit, per incoming call, from providing termination
services. In equilibrium, each firm i is optimizing given the fixed fee of the other network,
Fj, and consumer expectations. Using ∂αi/∂Fi = −σ, we have
dpii
dFi
= −σ [Fi − f + αj (βj, Fj, Fi)R(c+m)]+ αi (βi, Fi, Fj) [1 + σR(c+m)] .
Note that
d2pi
dF 2i
= −2σ(1 + σR(c+m)).
This means that a necessary local second-order condition is that 1 + σR(c+m) > 0, which
we will assume to hold.27 Solving the first-order condition for Fi we obtain
Fi =
f + 1
2σ
+ (1 + 2σR(c+m)) [(2βi − 1) (v(c)− v(c+m)) + Fj]
2 (1 + σR(c+m))
. (6)
27This condition holds for all m ≥ 0 and also for m < 0 as long as σ < −1/R(c+m).
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Solving the pair of first-order conditions yields:
Fi = f +
1
2σ
+
(
1 + 2σR(c+m)
3 + 4σR(c+m)
)
(2βi − 1) (v(c)− v(c+m)) . (7)
Substituting the expressions for F1 and F2 into Eq. (4) yields
αi =
1
2
+ 2σ
(
1 + 2σR(c+m)
3 + 4σR(c+m)
− 1
2
)
(1− 2βi) (v(c)− v(c+m)) . (8)
Using the fulfilled expectations condition αi = βi, Eq. (8) reduces to a linear equation
in αi with a unique solution: αi = 1/2. Note that the symmetry of the shared market
equilibrium is due to the assumption of a symmetric duopoly.28 There simply does not exist
any asymmetric shared market equilibrium. It follows immediately that at the equilibrium
F ∗ = f +
1
2σ
.
Previous literature has suggested that lower access charges will result in higher retail prices
for mobile subscribers, which is known as the waterbed effect. When consumer expectations
are passive, we have that at the equilibrium the fixed fee is equal to the fixed cost f plus the
Hotelling mark-up 1/2σ. That is, the waterbed effect is not at work on the fixed component
of the three-part tariff.
The analysis above has shown that there is a unique candidate for a shared market
equilibrium. To establish the existence of such an equilibrium not only requires the local
second-order condition mentioned, but also that the described strategies are in fact global
maximizers. In particular, one needs to verify that no firm wants to try to corner the market,
given the prices chosen by its competitor and given the expectations of consumers. Note
that the firm that corners the market by lowering its fixed fee, will also want to adjust the
on- and off-net prices. In particular, that firm will want to set the off-net price at zero.29
This is not costly to the firm (as no off-net calls will be made in a cornered market) but will
fool consumers with passive expectations who believe that half of their calls will be off-net.
If the indirect utility of making calls at zero price were unbounded, the firm would be able
to corner the market and make unbounded profits. Hence, existence of a shared market
equilibrium requires an upper bound on the utility obtained from making calls at zero price,
as assumed in section 3. This requirement is mild, as consumers can at most make calls
28This assumption is relaxed in Section 4.4.
29The firm will also increase the on-net price above cost.
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24 hours a day, but is not met by the constant elasticity demand function. The following
proposition establishes the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the shared market
equilibrium.30
Proposition 1 Any shared market equilibrium is symmetric and is characterized by p1 =
p2 = c, p̂1 = p̂2 = c +m and F1 = F2 = f +
1
2σ
. A necessary condition for existence is that
1 + σR(c+m) > 0. A sufficient condition is that σ is small enough.
Comparative statics. The symmetric equilibrium profit is
pi1 = pi2 =
1
4σ
+
1
4
R(c+m).
That is, networks gain the full profit from providing termination services (without competing
it away through lower fixed fees). The equilibrium profit is increasing in m when c+m < pM
and decreasing when c + m > pM . Equilibrium profits are maximized for the termination
mark-up m∗ that maximizes the termination profit:
dpii
dm
≡ 1
4
dR
dm
(c+m∗) = 0.
We thus have
Corollary 1 Under non-linear pricing and termination-based price discrimination, shared-
market equilibrium profits are maximized with the termination mark-up m∗ that maximizes
the termination profit, i.e. m∗ = pM − c > 0. Total welfare is maximized at mW = 0.
Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998b) show that in the case of rationally responsive expecta-
tions, the first-order derivative with respect to the equilibrium profit is:
dpii
dm
=
1
4
[−q(c+m) +mq′(c+m)]
=
1
4
dR
dm
(c+m)− 1
2
q(c+m).
The additional term −1
2
q(c+m) is produced by the assumption that consumers change their
expectations in response to any variation of prices such that they perfectly foresee realized
market shares. As a result,
dpii
dm
∣∣∣∣
m≥0
< 0,
30For expositional purposes we prove the existence of equilibrium for this case only. Our subsequent results
will focus on the characterization of equilibria only.
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so that firms prefer below-cost access charges. Gans and King (2001) provides the intuition
for this result:31 When m is positive, off-net calls are more expensive than on-net calls, so
that users then wish to belong to the larger network (all else being equal). This makes
it easier (or less costly) for firms to gain market share. This leads firms to compete more
aggressively for market share (i.e., the reaction functions shift downward) which results in
lower fixed fees in equilibrium. Firms prefer thus instead to have a negative termination
mark-up.
Sometimes an alternative but somewhat misleading intuition has been used to explain
the negative relation between the termination mark-up and the equilibrium profit. The
reasoning goes as follows: When m increases, users become more profitable, in the sense
that they bring with them higher termination profits, and this leads firms to compete more
aggressively for market share. This is not an essentially correct explanation of the impact of
m on equilibrium profits in the case of duopoly. Namely, termination profits are only made
on calls originated on the rival network. The number of such calls depends on market shares.
Firm i terminates ni = αi(1− αi) of such calls. At the symmetric equilibrium αi = 1/2 and
ni is in fact maximized. This is independent of m so that an increase in m will not induce
firms to fight more aggressively for consumers, at equilibrium, since a marginal change in
the fixed fee will have no impact on ni. What is true is that, out of equilibrium, the level of
the termination mark-up influences the optimal fixed fee. For example, if firm i at current
prices would have the smaller market share (αi < 1/2 and thus Fi > Fj), it would react
by lowering its fixed fee when the termination mark-up increases. But at the same time,
the rival firm with the higher market share (αj > 1/2) would react by increasing its fixed
fee in order to reduce αj and increase nj. Hence, the reaction function of each firm rotates
around the intersection point with the 45 degree line when m increases, and does not affect
the equilibrium fixed fee.
Figure 1 illustrates the above findings. For usage prices fixed at perceived marginal cost,
it shows the optimal fixed fee of firm i as a function of the fixed fee of firm j. From Eq. (6) we
know this is a linear function with positive slope less than one. The symmetric equilibrium
fixed fee is given by the intersection of the reaction function with the 45 degree line. An
increase in the termination mark-up leads the smaller (larger) firm to compete more (less)
aggressively, rotating the reaction function counterclockwise around the intersection point.
31Moreover, Gans and King (2001) building on this result show that the optimal termination mark-up
from the operators viewpoint is not zero (as Proposition 5 of Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998b erroneously
concludes) but below cost, so that maximum profits are above (and not bounded above by) the Hotelling
level 14σ , which is achieved with m = 0 (that is, with a = cT ).
19
Fi
Fj
(a) Passive expectations
45o
uF ∗
ri(Fj)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 























?
6
ri(Fj)
(b) Responsive expectations
Fi
Fj45
o
u
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 























?
6















?
?
u
F ∗
F ∗∗
Figure 1: The effect of an increase of m on equilibrium fixed fees in duopoly.
(See Fig. 1a.) Moreover, in the case of rationally responsive expectations an increase in the
termination mark-up shifts the reaction function downward. (See Fig. 1b.) This explains
why only in this case an increase in the termination mark-up reduces the equilibrium fixed
fee (from F ∗ till F ∗∗) and consequently the equilibrium profit.
Oligopolistic competition. The discussion thus far has focussed on duopoly. When
expectations are assumed passive, there is no waterbed effect as the equilibrium fixed fee
is independent of the termination mark-up. When expectations are rationally responsive,
on the other hand, there exists a very strong waterbed effect as the equilibrium fixed fee
decreases so fast withm that profits in fact decrease. Nonetheless, if the number of competing
networks is larger than two, then there will exist a partial waterbed effect on the fixed
component of the three-part tariff even if consumer expectations are passive. To see this,
assume that there exist n ≥ 3 competing networks. The first-order condition is
0 =
dpii
dFi
=
[
αi +
dαi
dFi
(Fi − f)
]
+
dαi
dFi
(1− 2αi)R(c+m).
In a symmetric equilibrium with two networks the second term of the right-hand side of the
above equation disappears, thereby m has no impact on the equilibrium fixed fee. Instead,
if n ≥ 3, then at any symmetric equilibrium αi = 1n < 12 , implying that the equilibrium fixed
fee will depend on m. Notice that at the symmetric equilibrium
Fi = f − 1
n
(
dαi
dFi
)−1
−
(
1− 2
n
)
R(c+m),
thus Fi decreases with m as long as m < m
∗. The reason is that the number of off-net calls
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Figure 2: The effect of an increase of m on equilibrium fixed fees in oligopoly (passive
expectations).
terminated on network i equals ni = αi(1 − αi) which is increasing in αi at αi = 1/n. As
m increases, the profit from terminating calls increases and each firm will compete more
fiercely for market share. Yet, the waterbed effect is less than one hundred per cent as
the equilibrium profit is still maximized with the termination mark-up that maximizes the
termination profit per terminated call:
pii =
1
n
[
− 1
n
(
dαi
dFi
)−1
+
1
n
R(c+m)
]
.
That is, the equilibrium profit is still maximized with m∗ = pM − c > 0. Recall that under
passive expectations dαi
dFi
does not depend on the termination mark-up. Note that total
welfare is maximized with termination charges at cost, independent of the number of firms
while consumer surplus is maximized with a negative termination mark-up.
Figure 2 explains why there is a partial waterbed effect when expectations are passive
and there are at least three firms. It shows the reaction function of firm i against the fixed
fee Fj which is assumed to be the same for all firms j 6= i. Again, the intersection of this
reaction function with the 45 degree line indicates the equilibrium fixed fee. An increase in
termination mark-up above 0 leads the reaction function to rotate counterclockwise around
the point X, defined as the point where firm i’s market share would be 1/2. This is because
the firm will fight more fiercely for market share when termination profit per call increases,
as long as its market share is less than 1/2. The equilibrium fixed fee thus decreases from
F ∗ till F ∗∗.
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4.2 Call externalities
In this section we extend the model to consider call externalities, as in Berger (2005). A call
externality exists if a consumer derives utility from receiving a call. It seems obvious that
call externalities exist, since otherwise nobody would bother to answer a call. How strong
such call externalities are is probably an empirical matter. Ofcom (2004) considers that “call
externalities probably do not justify any adjustment to call prices. [...] these are likely to be
effectively internalized by callers, as a high percentage of calls are from known parties and
there are likely to be implicit or explicit agreements to split the origination of calls.” On the
other hand, Harbord and Pagnozzi (2010) argue that call externalities are strong and that
therefore Bill and Keep is the appropriate termination charge regime, both from a social and
from a private perspective.
We assume that consumers derive utility u(q) from receiving calls of volume q, with
u = λu, where 0 < λ < 1 measures the strength of the call externality. If consumers expect
market shares β1 and β2, then they expect a net surplus
wi = βi [v(pi) + u(q(pi))] + βj[v(p̂i) + u(q(p̂j))]− Fi
from subscribing to network i, for i 6= j ∈ {1, 2}. The actual market share, αi, as a function
of the consumer expectations and prices, is determined by the indifferent consumer:
αi =
1
2
+ σβi [v(pi)− v(p̂j) + u(q(pi))− u(q(p̂i))] (9)
−σβj [v(pj)− v(p̂i) + u(q(pj))− u(q(p̂j))] + σ(Fj − Fi).
Network i’s profit is given by Eq. (1). As in Berger (2005) we have
Lemma 1 In a symmetric equilibrium with α1 = α2 = 1/2, networks set
pi = p
∗ ≡ c
1 + λ
and p̂i = p̂
∗ ≡ c+m
1− λ .
Therefore, in a symmetric equilibrium pi < c and p̂i > c +m, i.e., usage prices do not
reflect the perceived cost of calls. Networks find it optimal to internalize the call externality
by setting the on-net price below the cost so as to extract the higher consumer surplus
through the fixed fee. The off-net price, on the other hand, is set above the cost so as to
reduce the utility of rival’s customers from receiving calls. If λ tends to 1 (which amounts
to say that callers and receivers obtain the same utility from a given call), then the off-net
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price will tend to +∞, resulting in connectivity breakdown (as shown in Jeon et al. 2004).
The first-order condition is
0 =
dpii
dFi
= −σ
[
αiR(p
∗) + αjR̂(p̂∗) + Fi − f
]
+ αi
[
−σR(p∗) + σR̂(p̂∗) + 1
]
+σ (αi − αj)mq(p̂∗),
which defines i’s reaction function. Hence, in a symmetric equilibrium (α1 = α2 = 1/2) the
first-order condition is satisfied at Fi = F
∗ ≡ f + 1
2σ
−R(p∗) or, equivalently,
F ∗ ≡ f + 1
2σ
+ λcq
(
c
1 + λ
)
.
The equilibrium profit is thus
pi1 = pi2 =
1
4σ
+
1
4
[R(p̂∗)−R(p∗)] .
The equilibrium fixed fee is independent of m while equilibrium profits depend on m through
the off-net price.
Proposition 2 Under non-linear pricing, termination-based price discrimination and call
externalities, symmetric equilibrium profits are maximized with the termination mark-up m∗
that maximizes the retail profit earned on the off-net calls (gross of termination payments):
m∗ = argmaxm≥−cT R
(
c+m
1−λ
)
= max{(1− λ) pM − c,−cT}. Hence m∗ > 0 if and only if
λ < p
M−c
pM
.
In contrast with Jeon et al. (2004) and Berger (2005), the termination mark-up does not
affect the fixed fee. The reason is as before: if consumers do not change their expectations
with price variations, then ∂αi/∂Fi = −σ, i.e., the fixed fee affects the market share only
through the direct pecuniary effect but not via a change in the expectations of consumers.
Then, networks maximize shared-market equilibrium profits by setting the termination mark-
up m∗ that maximizes the retail profit from the off-net calls made by their subscribers. That
is, m∗ is so that p̂∗ = c+m
∗
1−λ equals p
M . The equilibrium profits are therefore higher with
an above cost access charge than with a below cost access charge when λ is relatively low.
When λ is close to 1, there is risk of connectivity breakdown because then p̂ > pM , even if
m = 0. In this case a below cost access charge brings p̂∗ down towards pM and increases
profits.
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The welfare maximizing termination mark-up mW is such that p̂∗ satisfies the condition
p̂∗ = p = c
1+λ
.32 Therefore, we have
Proposition 3 In the presence of call externalities, the socially optimal termination mark-
up is negative (aW < cT ) and given by m
W = max{− 2λc
1+λ
,−cT}. Hence mW < 0 < m∗ holds
when λ is relatively low.
This result is in contrast with Berger (2005), who shows that in the presence of ratio-
nally responsive expectations, the best termination charge from the operators’ perspective
is below cost and smaller than the socially optimal termination charge, that is, m∗ ≤ mW =
max{− 2λc
1+λ
,−cT} < 0, where the inequality binds when Bill and Keep is socially and pri-
vately optimal, i.e. when m∗ = mW = −cT . This occurs when externalities are relatively
strong. Berger (2005) even argues that regulatory intervention is superfluous in this case
since private and social incentives are then perfectly aligned. Our analysis shows that Bill
and Keep may be optimal from a social point of view, but firms will most likely prefer
termination charges above cost. Only if the call externality is extremely high, firms would
also prefer Bill and Keep. This requires firms setting off-net prices above monopoly price in
case termination charge is set at cost. Of course, if the externality is very strong, firms may
be tempted to abandon the calling party pays regime and to start charging subscribers for
receiving calls.
4.3 Linear pricing and termination-based price discrimination
In this section we analyze competition in linear prices − i.e., networks charge on- and off-net
calls but not the fixed fee. Under linear pricing and termination-based price discrimination,
and for some given expectations on market shares β1 and β2, the variable net surplus offered
to network i’s customers is
w(pi, p̂i) ≡ βiv(pi) + (1− βi)v(p̂i). (10)
32As there is full participation and payments are only transfers from one agent to another, what matters
is the utility that consumers derive from incoming and outgoing calls, and the cost of these calls. Given
that µ = λµ, the socially optimal price maximizes the expression u(q(p)) + λu(q(p)) − cq(p). Hence, this
price coincides with the equilibrium on-net price. (Recall that networks set the on-net price to maximize
consumer surplus so as to extract it via the fixed fee.)
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Market shares are determined by the indifferent customer:
α1 =
1
2
+ σ [w(p1, p̂1)− w(p2, p̂2)] (11)
=
1
2
+ σ [β1 (v(p1)− v(p̂2))− β2 (v(p2)− v(p̂1))] .
Differentiating Eq. (1) − where αi is given by Eq. (11) and Fi = 0 − with respect to pi and
p̂i, we have that at a symmetric equilibrium (p1 = p2 = p, p̂1 = p̂2 = p̂, αi = βi = 1/2):
[R(p)− f ]− R
′(p)
2σq(p)
= 0, (12)
[R(p)− f ]− R̂
′(p̂)
2σq(p̂)
= 0, (13)
Let pD be the equilibrium price in a duopoly model where termination-based price discrim-
ination is not allowed and m = 0. From Eq. (12) we have that the equilibrium on-net price
p∗ equals pD and is therefore neutral with respect to the access charge. Using Eqs. (12) and
(13) we obtain
q(p) + (p− c)q′(p)
q(p)
=
q(p̂) + (p̂− c−m)q′(p̂)
q(p̂)
. (14)
Assuming a constant elasticity demand function33 (η ≡ −q′(p)(p/q)), we can rewrite Eq.
(14) as follows
p̂
p
=
c+m
c
,
which coincides with the proportionality rule derived in Laffont, Rey and Tirole (Lemma 1,
1998b). However, here the off-net price is increasing in the termination mark-up: dp̂
dm
= p
∗
c
>
0 (since dp
∗
dm
= 0). It is easily established that pR < p∗ < pM .
In the symmetric equilibrium, i’s profit can be written as follows
pii =
1
4
[
R(pD) +R(p̂∗)− 2f] ,
where p̂∗ = pD
(
c+m
c
)
. We summarize our results in the next Proposition.
Proposition 4 Under linear pricing and termination-based price discrimination, in equi-
librium the on-net price does not depend on the access charge. Moreover, for a constant
elasticity call demand function
(i) the off-net price increases with the access charge;
33To guarantee existence of equilibrium we need v(p) to be bounded so that we need to cap the demand
function by setting q(p) = min{q¯, p−η} for some constant q¯.
25
(ii) the shared-market equilibrium profits are maximized with the termination mark-up
m∗ that maximizes the retail profit earned on the off-net calls R(p̂∗): m∗ =
(
pM
pD
− 1
)
c > 0;
(iii) total welfare is maximized by a termination subsidy mW < 0.
In the presence of rationally responsive expectations, and assuming a constant elasticity
demand function, Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998b) obtain that the on-net price decreases
with m, and the off-net price increases with m if the degree of substitutability σ is small,
though it may decrease with m otherwise. In addition, they obtain that if σ is small, then
the access charge that maximizes profits is above the cost (m > 0) and higher than the
access charge that is socially preferred, which is below the cost (m < 0). Nevertheless, they
also find that if σ is not that small, then the access charge that maximizes profits may be
lower. Indeed, it could be even below cost.34
Under passive expectations we obtain different results. Proposition 4 states that the
on-net price does not react to the level of the termination mark-up, whereas the off-net
price always increases with the termination mark-up (independently of the degree of substi-
tutability between the two networks). Consequently, networks find it profitable to increase
the access charge above the cost as it exerts upward pressure on the off-net price (towards
the monopoly level), which leads to higher profits.
Oligopolistic competition. The neutrality result on the on-net price is specific to
the number of competing networks (as the neutrality result on the fixed fee in the case of
three-part tariffs analyzed in section 4.1). If the number of competing networks is larger
than two, then there will exist a partial waterbed effect on the on-net price even if consumer
expectations are passive. As commented earlier, the number of terminated off-net calls
increases with a firm’s market share as long as it is below 1/2. Since an increase in the
termination mark-up increases the profit per terminated call, firms will fight more intensively
to gain market share. They do this by lowering the on-net price. Yet, simulations show that
the waterbed effect is less than one hundred percent. In particular, assuming a Logit model
with n ≥ 3 competing networks we obtain that: (i) on-net prices decrease and off-net prices
increase with m (in a neighborhood of m = 0); (ii) the profit maximizing termination mark-
up is positive and increasing in the number of networks; (iii) consumer surplus is maximized
with minimum mark-up mCS = −cT (i.e., with a = 0); (iv) total surplus is maximized with
a positive termination charge below cost (i.e. −cT < mW < 0). Table 1 reports optimal
34Simulations show that for η = 1.2, cT = 0.5, c = 2, f = 0 and σ = 1, the profit maximizing termination
mark-up equals m∗ = −0.10, whereas the total welfare maximizing termination mark-up is positive.
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termination charges for oligopolies with 2, 3, 4 and 5 firms.35 More details about prices,
profits and welfare can be found in Fig. 3.
Termination markup n = 2 n = 3 n = 4 n = 5
m∗ 0.414 0.538 0.61 0.66
mCS -0.50 -0.50 -0.50 -0.50
mW -0.293 -0.264 -0.265 -0.274
Table 1: Optimal termination mark-up for firms (m∗), consumer surplus (mCS) and total
welfare (mW ). Simulation parameters: η = 2, cT = 0.5, c = 1, f = 0, µ = 0.25.
4.4 Asymmetric networks
In this section we analyze the competition between two asymmetric networks, an incumbent
and a new entrant. We allow for brand loyalty as in Carter and Wright (1999, 2003) but
allow firms to use termination-based price discrimination. The parameter γ > 0 measures
the degree of asymmetry between the networks. The net surplus from subscribing to network
1 is
w1 = γt+ β1v(p1) + β2v(pˆ1)− F1,
whereas the net surplus offered to network 2’s consumers is
w2 = β2v(p2) + β1v(pˆ2)− F2.
Network i’s profit is given by Eq. (1). Thus, as in Section 4.1, in an equilibrium where firms
share the market, it is optimal to adopt cost-based usage prices: pi = c and p̂i = c+m. The
market share of network 1 is thus given by
α1 = 1− α2 = 1 + γ
2
+ σ (F2 − F1) + 2σ
(
β1 −
1
2
)
(v(c)− v(c+m)) . (15)
The first-order condition yields
Fi = f +
αi
σ
+ 2
(
αi − 1
2
)
R(c+m). (16)
35The parameter µ is the degree of product differentiation in a Logit model (see section 5).
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Equilibrium profit of firm i is thus
pii = α
2
i
(
1
σ
+R(c+m)
)
, (17)
where αi is given by Eqs. (15) and (16).
Proposition 5 In the presence of two asymmetric networks and starting from cost-based
termination charges (m = 0), in any shared-market equilibrium a small increase in the
termination charge:
(i) raises the fixed fee of the large network and lowers the fixed fee of the small network,
(ii) reduces the difference in market shares between the two networks,
(iii) leads to higher equilibrium profits for both the large and small network,
(iv) reduces total welfare.
Lo´pez and Rey (2009) analyze competition between two asymmetric networks (an in-
cumbent and a new entrant) in the presence of rationally responsive expectations. They
find that in the shared-market equilibrium a below-cost access charge generates higher equi-
librium profits (for the large and small network) than any above-cost access charge. Their
finding therefore extends the insight of Gans and King to asymmetric networks. In contrast,
Proposition 5 states that in the presence of passive expectations, increasing the access charge
above the cost, raises the equilibrium profit for both networks (as in the case of symmetric
networks studied in Section 4.1) while it reduces total welfare. In this asymmetric case an
increase in termination profit makes the large firm compete less fiercely for market share as
this in fact increases the number of calls to be terminated. The small firm will compete more
fiercely for market share. This makes equilibrium market shares less asymmetric, and thus
reduces the HHI index. Nevertheless, taking into account that network 1 provides higher
value (γ > 0), this distortion actually reduces total and consumer welfare.
5 Voluntary Subscription
In this section we do not assume that all consumers will subscribe to one of the two net-
works. Consumers have the option to stay unsubscribed. Since consumers can only call
to subscribers, consumers will care about the total number of people that will subscribe to
some network. In the case of termination-based price discrimination consumers will care
about the number of subscribers to each network. The addition of an extra subscriber has
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a positive benefit for all subscribers. The nature of competition impedes firms to fully in-
ternalize this externality. It has been argued by some mobile operators and regulators that
the termination charge should include a network externality surcharge so as to facilitate the
internalization of the externality. Dessein (2003) and Hurkens and Jeon (2009) show indeed
that when subscription demand is elastic, a surcharge may increase penetration and im-
prove total welfare. However, these models assume again rationally responsive expectations.
Moreover, these models also predict that firms prefer not to have a surcharge, since profits
are higher with termination charges below cost. We will now review this issue under the
assumption of passive expectations.
The Hotelling framework is not very well suited to address the issue of elastic subscription
demand. Namely, if some consumers in the center of the interval do not subscribe, networks
would operate like local monopolists, rather than as competitors.36 We therefore will use a
Logit model in which consumers have random utility.37
We consider competition between two networks. Each firm i (i = 1, 2) charges a fixed fee
Fi and may be allowed (or may not be allowed) to discriminate between on-net and off-net
calls. For ease of exposition we will continue to use the notation pi and pˆi for on- and off-net
call prices of firm i. When termination-based price discrimination is not allowed we impose
that pi = pˆi. Notation and definition of call demand is as before. In particular, given some
expectations β1 and β2, utility from subscribing to network 1 equals
w1 = β1v(p1) + β2v(pˆ1)− F1,
while subscribing to network 2 yields
w2 = β2v(p2) + β1v(pˆ2)− F2.
Finally, not subscribing at all yields utility w0.
We now add a random noise term and define U1 = w1 + µε1, U2 = w2 + µε2, and
U0 = w0 + µε0. The parameter µ > 0 reflects the degree of product differentiation in a
Logit model. A high value of µ implies that most of the value is determined by a random
draw so that competition between the firms is rather weak. The noise terms εk are random
variables of zero mean and unit variance, identically and independently double exponentially
36Armstrong and Wright (2009) consider a Hotelling model with hinterlands to address the possibility of
expansion.
37See Anderson and de Palma (1992) and Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992) for more details about
the Logit model.
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distributed. They reflect consumers’ preference for one good over another. A consumer will
subscribe to network 1 if and only if U1 > U2 and U1 > U0; he will subscribe to network 2
if and only if U2 > U1 and U2 > U0; he will not subscribe to any network otherwise. The
probability of subscribing to network i is denoted by αi where α0 represents the probability
to remain unsubscribed. The probabilities are given by
αi =
exp[wi/µ]∑2
k=0 exp[wk/µ]
. (18)
Note that for i = 1, 2
∂αi
∂Fi
= −αi(1− αi)
µ
, (19)
while for j ∈ {0, 1, 2}\{i}
∂αj
∂Fi
=
αiαj
µ
. (20)
Consumer surplus in the Logit model has been derived by Small and Rosen (1981) as (up to
a constant)
CS = µ ln
(
2∑
k=0
exp(wk/µ)
)
= w0 − µ ln(α0), (21)
where the right-hand side follows from (18). Clearly, consumer surplus is increasing in market
penetration 1− α0.
5.1 Equilibrium
We will first establish that also in a setting with voluntary participation firms will set variable
price equal to perceived marginal cost. The reason is simply that a firm can offer the same
consumer surplus by setting variable price closer to perceived marginal cost while adjusting
the fixed fee accordingly. This will keep the number of subscribers to each firm constant,
but improve the profit of the firm. The reasoning is valid both for the case where firms
are not allowed to charge different prices for on- and off-net calls and for the case where
this is allowed. Of course, the notion of perceived marginal cost depends on the case under
consideration. When firms can price discriminate, perceived marginal cost for on-net calls
equals c and perceived marginal cost for off-net calls equals c+m. In this case profit is given
by Eq. (1).
In the case where price discrimination is not allowed, we denote
c˜i =
αic+ αj(c+m)
αi + αj
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as the weighted average marginal cost of calls. Now, i’s profit can be rewritten as
pii = αi [(αi + αj)(pi − c˜i)q(pi) + Fi − f ] + αiαjmq(pˆj).
Using these expressions for profit, it is easy to establish the following perceived marginal
cost pricing result.
Lemma 2 (i) When firms can price discriminate between on- and off-net calls, in equi-
librium firm i will set pi = c and pˆi = c+m.
(ii) When firms cannot price discriminate between on- and off-net calls, in equilibrium firm
i will set pi = pˆi = c˜i. In a symmetric equilibrium c˜i = c+m/2.
Note that when m = 0, firms will not set distinct prices for on- and off-net calls even
when they are allowed to do so.
Given the perceived marginal cost pricing result, profits can be rewritten (in both cases)
as:
pii = αi(Fi − f) + αiαjmq(pˆj).
Profits stem from the fixed fee and from termination services. The necessary first-order
condition with respect to the fixed fee thus gives38
0 =
∂αi
∂Fi
(Fi − f) + αi + [αi∂αj
∂Fi
+ αj
∂αi
∂Fi
]mq(pˆj).
Substituting (19) and (20) and re-arranging yields
Fi = f +
µ
1− αi − q(pˆj)
αj(1− 2αi)
1− αi .
Looking for a symmetric solution with αi = αj = α, we find the following relation
between equilibrium fixed fee and equilibrium number of subscribers per firm:
F = f +
µ
1− α −mq(pˆ)
α(1− 2α)
1− α , (22)
where pˆ is the equilibrium off-net price.39 We will denote the right-hand side of equation
(22) by F FOC(α,m) and we will refer to this curve as the equilibrium curve.
38Firm i keeps pˆj constant when choosing fixed fee, although we know that in equilibrium, in the case of
no termination-based price discrimination, pj = c˜j depends on subscription rates.
39Thus pˆ = c+m when termination-based price discrimination is allowed for, and pˆ = c+m/2 when this
is not.
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From (18) we know that expectations being fulfilled in the case of a symmetric solution
(F, p, pˆ) requires that the number of subscribers per firm (denoted by α), must satisfy
α =
exp[(αv(p) + αv(pˆ)− F )/µ]
2 exp[(αv(p) + αv(pˆ)− F )/µ] + exp[w0/µ] .
This can be rewritten as
F = αv(p) + αv(pˆ)− w0 − µ log
(
α
1− 2α
)
. (23)
We will denote the right-hand side of equation (23) by FRE(α,m) and we will refer to this
curve as the rational expectations curve.
A symmetric equilibrium with fulfilled expectations is thus found by solving the system
of equations (22) and (23). It is easily verified that this system of equations always admits a
solution. Namely, for any given and fixed m, the (continuous) equilibrium curve is bounded
on the interval [0, 1/2] while the rational expectation curve approaches +∞ as α ↓ 0 while
it approaches −∞ as α ↑ 1/2. The following lemma gives a sufficient condition for the
uniqueness of such a solution. We will denote this solution (indexed by m) as (F (m), α(m)).
Since we will be particularly interested in how profits and welfare behave in a neighborhood
of m = 0, we introduce (F ∗, α∗) = (F (0), α(0)). Recall that for m = 0, it does not matter
whether termination-based price discrimination is allowed or not, since firms do not find it
optimal to discriminate. However, when doing comparative statics with respect to termi-
nation mark-up m around 0, one should distinguish between the case of termination-based
price discrimination and uniform call prices.
Lemma 3 For |m| small enough and µ > v(c)/4, the system of equations (22) and (23) has
a unique solution.
5.2 Comparative statics
We now investigate how the equilibrium behaves in a neighborhood of m = 0. We first estab-
lish that an increase in the termination mark-up above 0 reduces the number of subscribers
and reduces equilibrium fixed fees.
Proposition 6 A marginal increase in the termination mark-up above 0 lowers overall sub-
scription and equilibrium fixed fees.
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From Lemma 2 we know that an increase in the termination fee raises usage price40, since
termination costs are passed onto consumers. This also means that consumers bring with
them termination profits. Competition for customers becomes fiercer and this leads firms to
charge lower fixed fees in equilibrium. This means that there is a waterbed effect at play.
However, the effect is less than one hundred per cent. Consumers are not fully compensated
by lower fixed fee for the higher call price and this is why less consumers will subscribe. It
is not obvious how profits are affected by an increase in termination mark-up. Namely, an
increase in the termination charge improves termination profits. We will now analyze the
total effect on equilibrium profits (and on welfare). In equilibrium, profit equals
pi(m,F, α) = α(F − f) + α2mq(pˆ).
We first analyze how profits change along the rational expectations curve FRE(α, 0)
(when termination charge is fixed at a = cT ) as market penetration is varied. Note that
profits, in this case, are just equal to Π = α(FRE(α, 0)− f) so that
∂pi
∂α
= FRE(α, 0)− f + α∂F
RE
∂α
.
Using that at m = 0, FRE(α, 0) = F FOC(α, 0) = µ/(1− α) + f , one obtains
∂pi
∂α
= α
2v(c)(1− α)(1− 2α)− µ
(1− α)(1− 2α) .
The sign is ambiguous since it is negative for mature markets (when α ≈ 1/2) while it is
positive for α ≈ 0 and µ < 2v(c). If the sign is negative, it means that colluding networks
would prefer to increase fixed fees and lower market penetration. This is the case if compe-
tition is effective in terms of boosting penetration and lowering prices. We will refer to this
case as one of effective competition. If the sign is positive, it means the opposite, that is,
firms would prefer to increase penetration and reduce fixed fees. This would be the case in
which externalities are important and are not well internalized under competition. We will
refer to this case as one of strong network externalities.
Next, we consider how the profit changes as the termination charge is changed, keeping
market penetration constant. An increase in m increases termination profits, but decreases
the fixed fee. At m = 0 these effects exactly cancel out.
40When termination-based price discrimination is allowed, only off-net usage price increases.
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∂pi
∂m
∣∣∣∣
m=0
= α
∂FRE
∂m
+ α2q(c) = 0,
where the second equality follows from Eq. (23) and v′(c) = −q(c). Putting the two effects
together shows that
dpi
dm
∣∣∣∣
m=0
=
∂pi
∂m
+
∂pi
∂F
dF
dm
+
∂pi
∂α
∂α
∂m
= α2q(c) + α
(
∂F
∂m
+
∂F
∂α
∂α
∂m
)
+ (F − f) ∂α
∂m
= α2q(c) + α
(
−αq(c) + ∂F
∂α
∂α
∂m
)
+ (F − f) ∂α
∂m
=
∂α
∂m
(
F − f + α∂F
∂α
)
.
Note that the expression between brackets in the last line is just the derivative with
respect to α of profits along the rational expectations curve. If profits increase along the
rational expectations curve (low µ and low market penetration), then an increase of the
termination charge lowers profits, since ∂α/∂m < 0 from Proposition 6. On the other hand,
if profits decrease along the rational expectations curve, then an increase in the termination
charge increases the profits. This case happens exactly when colluding firms would set a
higher fixed fee than what they would choose under competition, and when market penetra-
tion would be lower under monopoly than under duopoly. The latter situation is the more
likely scenario, especially for European countries where penetration rates are close to 100
per cent.
We now turn our attention to the effects of termination charges on consumer and total
surplus. Note that total surplus is just the sum of consumer surplus and industry profit:
TS = CS + 2pi.
From (21) we know that dCS/dm = (∂α/∂m)(2µ/(1− 2α)). Hence
dTS
dm
∣∣∣∣
m=0
=
(
∂α
∂m
)(
2µ
1− 2α + 2
(
F − f + α∂F
∂α
))
= 2
(
∂α
∂m
)(
2αv(c) +
µ
1− α
)
.
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Since the second factor is positive, total surplus increases whenever market penetration
(or consumer surplus) increases.
Proposition 7 In order to maximize either consumer surplus or total surplus, the termina-
tion charge has to be set strictly below the cost of termination. Firms’ profits are maximized
by a termination charge above the cost of termination if and only if µ > 2v(c)(1−α∗)(1−2α∗)
(that is, if and only if competition is effective).
This result is in stark contrast with Dessein (2003) and Hurkens and Jeon (2009). Des-
sein (2003) does not allow for termination-based price discrimination while Hurkens and
Jeon (2009) do. Both papers find that firms always prefer termination charge below the cost
of termination. Moreover, they both find that in the (plausible) case of effective competi-
tion, consumer surplus and total welfare are maximized when termination charge is above
cost. Instead, we find that an externality surcharge does not improve penetration. The
argument that some operators successfully used to convince Ofcom and other NRAs to allow
for a mark-up above cost has thus shown to be misleading. Our result thus underpins the
Recommendation of the European Commission that externality surcharges in fact distort
competition.
6 Conclusion
This article has studied how consumer expectations affect retail competition when network
externalities exist. As in Katz and Shapiro (1985) and related literature on network exter-
nalities, we assume that first consumers form expectations about network sizes, then firms
compete, and last consumers make rational subscription and consumption decisions based
on their expectations and the chosen prices. Expectations must be fulfilled in equilibrium.
Instead, in the literature on termination charges and tariff-mediated network externalities
(starting from Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 1998b), rational expectations are imposed interim:
any change of a price by one firm leads to a rational change in consumer expectations for
which subscription decisions are such that realized and expected network sizes coincide. We
have shown that the way consumers form expectations and how these react to price vari-
ations have important implications in terms of the impact of termination charges on retail
competition. We have shown that if expectations are modeled as in Katz and Shapiro (1985),
results regarding the impact of mobile termination rates on retail competition are in fact
in line with real world observations. In particular, we overturn the Gans and King (2001)
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result: in our model when firms compete in fixed fees and charge different prices for on- and
off-net calls, they prefer a termination charge above cost so that off-net calls are priced at
monopoly levels (socially optimal termination charges are equal to cost). Moreover, fixed
fees and on-net prices are neutral with respect to the termination charge and thus, in the
case of full participation and two networks, there is no waterbed effect at all. If the number
of competing networks is larger than two, then there exists a partial waterbed effect on the
subscription fee. Our theoretical results are thus in line with the empirical evidence of the
existence of a waterbed effect that is not full, provided by Genakos and Valletti (2009).
Our results provide formal support to the relatively commonly-held view in the decision
practice on mobile markets that firms benefit from high termination rates. Given the cur-
rent debate on the optimal level of mobile termination rates, our results have direct policy
implications. Mobile network operators (MNOs) have opposed cuts in termination charges
over the past decade, and they keep doing so. This is of course a clear sign that mobile
operators fear to see their profits reduced. The arguments these operators employ to defend
their opposition against lowering termination charges sometimes make reference to the exis-
tence of a waterbed effect. They warn regulators that cutting termination rates may lead to
higher prices and that may hurt consumers. Regulators have not been very empathetic to
this argument and sometimes even denied the existence of a waterbed effect. For example,
the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC, 2007), wrote “The Com-
mission considers that these trends of lower average retail prices [ ... ] demonstrate that
the converse of the ‘waterbed’ effect has been in operation.” The New Zealand Commerce
Commission (NZCC, 2006) initially discarded the existence of a waterbed effect, but after
the intervention by Prof. Hausman, acting on behalf of one of the MNOs, acknowledged
the possible existence of a waterbed effect. However, the NZCC noted that to the extent
that there is a waterbed effect, whereby retail mobile prices are adjusted in some way in
response to regulation, it considered it likely that mobile prices will decline under regulation
but at a slower rate than without. The UK regulator (Ofcom 2004) accepts the existence
of a waterbed effect, but does not believe it is full because the retail market is not yet fully
competitive. On the other hand, Ofcom (2004, 2007) and some other NRAs did accept the
suggestion that a externality surcharge to promote subscription was appropriate. Our model
shows that this conclusion is not warranted and that the Recommendation of the European
Commission to not allow for such a mark-up is correct.
The present paper has considered a number of theoretical models (linear and non-linear
pricing, duopoly and oligopoly, symmetric and asymmetric firms, elastic and inelastic sub-
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scription demand, and call externalities) and shows that a waterbed effect often does exist
but that it is always less than full, so that consumer welfare is improved when termination
charges are reduced toward or even below cost. A further important lesson from our paper
is that more competition in the telecommunication market may not be effective if it is not
accompanied by continued adequate regulation of the monopolistic bottlenecks. In fact, reg-
ulation may be even more important in these cases since the number of off-net calls decreases
with the HHI index.
We have assumed that the expectations of consumers do not change with price variations
(off the equilibrium path) and that expectations are fulfilled in equilibrium. We believe this
to be a plausible assumption in the context of telecommunication markets. Notwithstanding,
we believe it will be important to consider a truly dynamic model where consumers face
switching costs and where expectations are formed endogenously. A key question would be
whether the results in such a dynamic model resemble the ones obtained in the static model
with passive or with responsive expectations. We hope that this article will stimulate further
research extending the analysis in this direction. Although the current paper has already
considered a wide range of models, a number of issues that deserve further investigation
has remained unaddressed. For example, how do passive expectations affect equilibrium
outcomes when (i) different types of consumers are allowed for?; (ii) the called party also
pays? (as is the case in Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore and the US); (iii) when both fixed
and mobile operators compete with each other?
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1:
We have already established that there is a unique candidate for a shared market equi-
librium. We need to show that for σ small enough, this candidate solution is indeed an
equilibrium. We fix the strategy for firm 2 as p2 = c, pˆ2 = c + m and F2 = f + 1/(2σ).
Moreover, we fix consumer expectations at β1 = β2 = 1/2. We need to calculate the optimal
response of firm 1. Recall from our discussion of the perceived marginal cost pricing that
firm 1, in order to maximize its profit, can adjust its fixed fee F1 so as to keep market share
constant at α1. The on- and off-net price have to satisfy the first-order conditions (2) and
(3), respectively. Denote these prices by p1(α1) and pˆ1(α1). One derives immediately that
for 0 < α1 < 1
R′(p1(α1)) =
q(p1(α1))
2α1
> 0 (24)
and
R̂′(pˆ1(α1)) =
q(pˆ1(α1))
2(1− α1) > 0. (25)
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Hence, p1(α1) < p
M and pˆ1(α1) < p
M .
Let F1(α1) denote the fixed fee that yields firm 1 indeed a market share of α1. That is,
F1(α1) = f +
1− α1
σ
+
1
2
[v(p1(α1)) + v(pˆ1(α1))− v(c)− v(c+m)].
Finding the optimal response for firm 1 boils down to finding the optimal market share.
The profit of firm 1, as a function of chosen market share, is
Π1(α1) = α1
(
α1R(p1(α1)) + (1− α1)R̂(pˆ1(α1))− f + F1(α1)
)
+ α1(1− α1)mq(c+m).
Note that Π1(0) = 0 and that, since F1(1) < f + v(0), for σ small enough
Π1(1) < R(p
M) + v(0) < 1/(4σ) +mq(c+m)/4 = Π1(1/2).
Because the profit function is continuous, there exist α and α¯ with 0 < α < α¯ < 1 so that
the profit function will be maximized on the interval [α, α¯].
Because of the envelope theorem, the partial derivatives with respect to on-net and off-net
price are equal to zero, so that
dΠ1
dα1
= 2α1R(p1(α1)) + (1− 2α1)R̂(pˆ1(α1))− f + F1(α1)− α1
σ
+ (1− 2α1)mq(c+m).
Note that at α1 = 1/2 the first order derivative indeed equals zero since p1(1/2) = c,
pˆ1(1/2) = c +m, and F (1/2) = f + 1/(2σ). Using expressions (24) and (25) we can write
the second-order derivative as
d2Π1
dα21
= 2R(p1(α1))+
q(p1(α1))p
′
1(α1)
2
−2R̂(pˆ1(α1))− α1q(pˆ1(α1))pˆ
′
1(α1)
2(1− α1) −2(
1
σ
+mq(c+m)).
Clearly, for small enough σ this is strictly negative as the first 4 terms of this expression
are bounded on the interval [α, α¯].
Proof of Lemma 1:
For given rival strategies, maximizing pii with respect to pi, while adapting Fi so as to
keep market shares constant, yields
αi
[
αi (q(pi) + (pi − c) q′(pi)) + dFi
dpi
]
= 0. (26)
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For a constant αi, differentiating Eq. (9) with respect to pi yields
σ
[
βi (q(pi)− u′(q(pi))q′(pi)) +
dFi
dpi
]
= 0. (27)
In equilibrium, expectations are fulfilled (βi = αi), then from Eqs. (26) and (27) we have
that c− pi = u′(q(pi)). Since u(q) = λu(q) and u′(q) = p, it follows that
pi = p
∗ ≡ c
1 + λ
. (28)
Similarly, for given rival strategies, the first-order derivative of i’s profit with respect to p̂i,
while adapting Fi so as to maintain market shares constant, yields
αi
[
αj (q(p̂i) + (p̂i − c)q′(p̂i))− αjmq′(p̂i) + dFi
dp̂i
]
= 0. (29)
By differentiating αi with respect to p̂i we obtain
−σβiu′(q(p̂i))q′(p̂i)− σβjq(p̂i)− σ
dFi
dp̂i
= 0. (30)
Comparing Eqs. (29) and (30), we have that βiu
′(q(p̂i))q′(p̂i) = αj(p̂i − c−m)q′(p̂i). Using
u′(q) = λp̂i, we obtain βiλp̂i = αj(p̂i − c−m), where βi = αi. Hence
p̂i = p̂
∗(αi) ≡ (1− αi) (c+m)
1− αi (1 + λ) . (31)
Proof of Proposition 5:
Profits in equilibrium are given by (17). Totally differentiating with respect to m gives
dpii
dm
= 2αi
dαi
dm
(
1
σ
+mq(c+m)
)
+ α2i (q(c+m) +mq
′(c+m)) .
Evaluating this derivative at m = 0 yields
dpii
dm
∣∣∣∣
m=0
=
2αi
σ
dαi
dm
∣∣∣∣
m=0
+ α2i q(c). (32)
Totally differentiating (15) and (16), using α2 = 1− α1, gives
dαi
dm
= σ
(
dFj
dm
− dFi
dm
)
+ 2σ
(
βi −
1
2
)
q(c+m)
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and
dFi
dm
=
1
σ
dαi
dm
+ 2
dαi
dm
mq(c+m) + 2
(
αi − 1
2
)
(q(c+m) +mq′(c+m)) .
Evaluating this derivative at m = 0 yields
dFi
dm
∣∣∣∣
m=0
=
1
σ
dαi
dm
∣∣∣∣
m=0
+ 2
(
αi − 1
2
)
q(c).
Thus, we have that
dαi
dm
∣∣∣∣
m=0
=
2σ
3
[
2
(
1
2
− αi
)
+
(
βi −
1
2
)]
q(c).
Self-fulfilling expectations imply that at equilibrium βi = αi, thus
dαi
dm
∣∣∣∣
m=0
= −2σ
3
(
αi − 1
2
)
q(c) i = 1, 2, (33)
and
dFi
dm
∣∣∣∣
m=0
=
4
3
(
αi − 1
2
)
q(c).
That is, starting from cost-based access charges, a slight increase in m, raises F1 (lowers
α1) and lowers F2 (raises α2), which in turn reduces the asymmetry between the networks.
Substituting Eq. (33) into Eq. (32) we get that
dpii
dm
∣∣∣∣
m=0
=
2
3
αi
(
1− αi
2
)
q(c) > 0 i = 1, 2.
Finally, total surplus equals
TS(m) = α1[γ/(2σ) + α1v(c) + (1− α1)(u(q(c+m))− cq(c+m))]
+(1− α1)[(1− α1)v(c) + α1(u(q(c+m))− cq(c+m))]
− 1
2σ
[
α1
2
α1 +
1− α1
2
(1− α1)].
Using that at m = 0, α1 = (γ + 3)/6, one easily verifies that
dTS
dm
∣∣∣∣
m=0
= −q(c)γ
2
27
< 0.
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Appendix B
Proof of Lemma 2:
(i) Suppose that (pi, pˆi) 6= (c, c + m). We claim that firm i can improve its profit by
changing its tariff from (pi, pˆi, Fi) to (c, c+m, F˜i) where F˜i is defined by
βiv(pi) + βjv(pˆi)− Fi = βiv(c) + βjv(c+m)− F˜i.
Such a change leaves the expected utility for subscribing to any of the networks unal-
tered, and will thus lead to the same subscription decisions. The difference in profit
for firm i is thus equal to
αi[F˜i − Fi − αi(pi − c)q(pi)− αj(pˆi − (c+m))q(pˆi)] =
αi(αi[v(c)− v(pi) + v′(pi)(pi − c)] + αj[v(cˆ)− v(pˆi) + v′(pˆi)(pˆi − (c+m))]) > 0
where the equality follows from self-fulfilled expectations (βk = αk) whereas the in-
equality follows from the fact that v(·) is a strictly convex and decreasing function.
The deviation is thus profitable.
(ii) Suppose that pi 6= c˜i. We claim that firm i can improve its profit by changing its tariff
from (pi, Fi) to (c˜i, F˜i) where F˜i is defined by
(βi + βj)v(pi)− Fi = (βi + βj)v(c˜i)− F˜i.
Such a change leaves the utility for subscribing to any of the networks unaltered,
and will thus lead to the same subscription decisions. Given self-fulfilled expectations
(βk = αk) the difference in profit for firm i is thus equal to
αi[F˜i − Fi − (αi + αj)(pi − c˜i)q(pi)] = αi(αi + αj)[v(c˜i)− v(pi) + v′(pi)(pi − c˜i)] > 0
where the inequality follows from the fact that v(·) is a strictly convex and decreasing
function. The deviation is thus profitable.
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Proof of Lemma 3:
Let m = 0 and α ∈ (0, 1/2). Then
∂F FOC
∂α
=
µ
(1− α)2 > 0,
while
∂FRE
∂α
= 2v(c)− µ
α(1− 2α) < 0
whenever µ > v(c)/4. So, for m = 0, the equilibrium curve intersects the rational expecta-
tions curve from below. By continuity, the same holds for |m| small enough. Hence, there is
exactly one solution.
Proof of Proposition 6:
Proof. Note that
dFRE
dm
∣∣∣∣
m=0
= −α∗q(c)
while
dF FOC
dm
∣∣∣∣
m=0
= −α∗q(c)1− 2α
∗
1− α∗ .
An increase in m thus lowers the rational expectations curve by more than the equilibrium
curve. The intersection point thus shifts to the south-west, lowering subscription rate and
fixed fee.
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Figure 3: Effect of termination mark-up m on on-net price, off-net price, profit, consumer
surplus and total welfare in the case of linear pricing.
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